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EVIDENCE
I. DEFENDANTS' RIGHT TO AN OPENING STATEMENT
Practitioners in South Carolina have long believed that
there is no absolute right to an opening statement." In State v.
Brown,2 the South Carolina Supreme Court confirmed this belief
by holding that allowing the opportunity to make an opening
statement and the timing of the statement are decisions within
the discretion of the trial judge.3 This decision represents the
court's first definitive statement on these issues.4
Brown was accused of distribution of unlawful drugs.5 At
trial, the State chose not to make an opening statement. Defense
counsel's request for the opportunity to make an opening state-
ment was denied. The trial judge based his ruling on the belief
that, because the prosecution had declined to make an opening
statement, the court had no authority to permit a statement by
1. State v. Brown, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 778 (1981)(citing Lide, Some "Uniques"
in South Carolina Law, 1 S.C.L.Q 109 (1949)).
2. - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 777 (1981).
3. Id. at -, 284 S.E2d at 778. It is unfortunate that the court emphasized this
"belief" reported in 1949, instead of giving recognition to the desire evidenced by the
South Carolina Bar in December 1979. According to a subcommittee memorandum, the
Committee on Practice and Procedure of the South Carolina Bar had proposed the fol-
lowing rule in August of 1980: "At the beginning of the case or at the beginning of his
side of the case, counsel for any party in the Circuit Court shall be entitled to make an
opening statement setting out the facts the party will attempt to prove." Letter from the
Subcommittee to Study the Scope and Content of Opening Statements to the Committee
on Practice and Procedure of the South Carolina Bar (August 6, 1980). The Board of
Governors of the South Carolina Bar approved the proposed rule at its meeting on Octo-
ber 27, 1979, and the House of Delegates approved it on November 15, 1979. Id. Al-
though the proposed rule was submitted to the South Carolina Supreme Court by the
Bar, the court has never taken action on the rule.
Further, in February 1980 a bill (H-3542) was introduced in the House of Represent-
atives proposing a rule on opening statements that mirrored the rule submitted by the
South Carolina Bar. The bill was not referred to a subcommittee, and it appears that no
action was ever taken by the General Assembly. Id.
4. Brief for Appellant at 2; Brief for Respondent at 1. In State v. Harris, 275 S.C.
463, 272 S.E.2d 636 (1980), the court held that the scope of an opening statement is also
within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will stand absent a showing of
abuse of discretion and prejudice to the complaining party. Id. at 465, 272 S.E.2d at 638.
5. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 778.
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the defense. Brown was subsequently convicted and sentenced
to thirty months imprisonment.6
The supreme court affirmed Brown's conviction, holding
that the granting and timing of an opening statement are discre-
tionary with the trial judge.7 The court concluded that although
the trial judge was mistaken in his belief that he lacked author-
ity to allow the defense to make an opening statement, the ac-
cused's right to be heard was not substantially impaired." In
reaching its decision, the court gave special consideration to the
prosecution's choice not to make an opening statement and the
defense counsel's thorough closing statement.9
The generally agreed upon purposes of an opening state-
ment are to inform the jury of the facts relied upon to establish
the defense, 10 the general nature of the legal issues involved,"
and the relationship between law and fact, so that the jurors'
understanding of the evidence will be enhanced. 2 Jurisdictions
are, however, divided in their treatment of the issue of whether
a defendant has a right to make an opening statement. Some
confer an absolute statutory right to an opening statement,"
while others recognize this right even absent a statutory man-
date.14 In the remaining jurisdictions, the issue is within the dis-
6. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 778.
7. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 778.
8. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 778-79.
9. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 779.
10. See, e.g., State v. Burruell, 98 Ariz. 37, 401 P.2d 733 (1965); People v. Gomez,
131 Colo. 576, 283 P.2d 949 (1955); People v. McDowell, 284 Ill. 504, 120 N.E. 482 (1918);
People v. Hampton, 78 Ill. App. 3d 238, 397 N.E.2d 117 (1979).
11. See, e.g., People v. Gomez, 131 Colo. 576, 283 P.2d 949 (1955); Jennings v.
United States, 431 A.2d 552 (D.C. 1981).
12. See, e.g., Turley v. State, 48 Ariz. 61, 59 P.2d 312 (1936); Jennings v. United
States, 431 A.2d 552 (D.C. 1981).
13. Eog., State v. Guffey, 205 Kan. 9, 468 P.2d 254 (1970); Commonwealth v. Wee-
den, 457 Pa. 436, 322 A.2d 343 (1974); cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937 (1975); Crew v. State,
387 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); Dugan v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 422, 199 S.W. 616
(1917).
14. Eog., Turley v. State, 48 Ariz. 61, 59 P.2d 312 (1936); Jennings v. United States,
431 A.2d 552 (D.C. 1981); Hampton v. United States, 269 A.2d 441 (D.C. 1970); People v.
McDowell, 284 11. 504, 120 N.E. 482 (1918); People v. Hampton, 78 IM. App. 3d 238, 397
N.E.2d 117 (1979); People v. Chivas, 322 Mich. 384, 34 N.E.2d 22 (1948). One of these
courts has gone so far as to "take judicial notice that for many years both trial and
appellate courts in this jurisdiction have assumed the right of both the prosecutor and
defense counsel to make opening statements to the jury." Hampton v. United States, 269
A.2d 441, 442 (D.C. 1970).
2
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cretion of the trial judge. 5
Jurisdictions that subscribe to the absolute right of a defen-
dant in a criminal trial to make an opening statement recognize
the importance of affording the defendant an opportunity to
outline his defense for the jury.' The opening statement serves
to clarify the facts and issues for the jury.17 If no opening state-
ment is made, the jury has no framework within which to place
the disjointed bits and pieces of testimony. Confusion is more
likely to result than if the opening statement had been made.
The defendant in a criminal trial must be afforded every oppor-
tunity to make the elements of his defense clear to the jury. De-
nial of the right to an make an opening statement deprives the
defendant of one of these opportunities and may substantially
impair his defense.
Jurisdictions that subscribe to the discretionary rule do not
perceive the opening statement as a fundamental element of a
fair trial. The court's decision in Brown follows this reasoning
and places South Carolina law in line with these jurisdictions."8
The timing of opening statements, when permitted, is also a
matter of some disagreement among jurisdictions. In some
states, the courts have held that statutory timing cannot be al-
tered. 9 Other courts have held that the statutes do not deprive
the trial court of the power to vary the prescribed order.20 The
remaining group leaves the matter solely to the discretion of the
trial judge.21 This discretionary approach is based on the princi-
15. E.g., Stewart v. State, 245 Ala. 511, 17 So.2d 871 (1944); Henderson v. State, 158
Fla. 684, 29 So. 2d 698 (1947); People v. April, 97 Ill. App. 2d 1, 239 N.E.2d 285 (1968);
Black v. State, 308 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1975). See, State v. Garlington, 90 S.C. 138, 72 S.E.
564 (1911). See also, Schwartz v. Fein, 471 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1971).
16. See, e.g., People v. Chivas, 322 Mich. 384, 392, 34 N.W.2d 22, 26 (1948).
17. See supra notes 10-12.
18. State v. Brown, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 777.
19. E.g., Jackson v. State, 249 Ark. 653, 460 S.W.2d 319 (1970); Buise v. State, 258
Ind. 321, 281 N.E.2d 93 (1972); Ballard v. State, 514 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
But cf. State v. Olson, 156 Mont. 339, 480 P.2d 822 (1971)(the statute the court relied
upon expressly allowed the trial court to deviate from the designated timing).
20. E.g., Williams v. State, 170 Ind. 644, 85 N.E. 349 (1908); State v. Guffey, 205
Kan. 9, 468 P.2d 254 (1970); People v. Seiler, 246 N.Y. 262, 158 N.E. 615 (1927); Brown
v. State, 50 Okla. Crim. 103, 297 P. 303 (1931); Commonwealth v. Weeden, 457 Pa. 436,
322 A.2d 343 (1974); cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937 (1975).
21. E.g., State v. Hargrove, 282 Ala. 13, 208 So. 2d 444 (1968); Henderson v. State,
158 Fla. 684, 29 So. 2d 698 (1947); Berryhill v. Ricketts, 242 Ga. 447, 249 S.E.2d 197
(1978); Smith v. State, 386 So. 2d 1117 (Miss. 1980). Accord, State v. Lee, 255 S.C. 309,
1982]
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ple that allowing the judge to use his discretion in such matters
results in an orderly and balanced approach to trial.2 Discre-
tionary rulings are not disturbed by appellate courts absent a
showing by the record of abuse of discretion.23 The Brown deci-
sion adopts the discretionary rule, and evinces the court's defer-
ence to the trial court judge.
2 4
By failing to recognize the absolute right to an opening
statement by a defendant and vesting the trial court with the
discretion to decide if and when an opening statement can be
made, the supreme court has made the trial judge an even more
critical participant in a criminal trial. Judges must recognize the
impact a denial of the right to an opening statement can have,
and use this discretion to assure defendants the fairest trial
possible.
II. INDEPENDENT CRIME OF THE ACCUSED
In State v. Turbeville,2 5 the Supreme Court of South Caro-
lina upheld admission of testimony concerning an independent
crime committed by the accused. The court found that the inde-
pendent crime was relevant to prove the accused's state of mind
on the night he allegedly shot and killed another man. 6
Turbeville reaffirms the supreme court's intent to allow evidence
of independent crimes if it falls within one of five exceptions to
the general rule against its admissibility. While this approach
lends a degree of certainty to South Carolina evidence law, it
may result in trial courts overlooking the prejudicial effect of
such evidence on the jury.
Turbeville, an off-duty deputy sheriff, killed his girlfriend's
brother during a struggle and was indicted for murder.27 At trial,
the State was allowed to introduce testimony that proved the
178 S.E.2d 652 (1971).
22. Commonwealth v. Weeden, 457 Pa. 436, 448, 322 A.2d 343, 349 (1974), cert. de-
nied, 420 U.S. 937 (1975)(quoting from the decision of the trial court).
23. Frazier v. State, 365 So. 2d 339, 341 (Ala. Crim. App. 1978).
24. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 778-79.
25. 275 S.C. 534, 273 S.E.2d 764 (1981).
26. Id. at 536, 273 S.E.2d at 765.
27. Brief for Appellant at 3. The accused, the decedent, the girlfriend, and four
other people were together during both the alleged night hunting and the homicide. Id.
at 3-4. Turbeville stated that he and the victim were "close friends." Record at 221.
[Vol. 34
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accused had committed an independent crime, night hunting, s
on the evening of the murder. Turbeville was convicted of invol-
untary manslaughter 29 and appealed, charging that the trial
court judge had erred in admitting the independent crime testi-
mony. The South Carolina Supreme Court upheld the admission
of the testimony and affirmed the conviction.
The supreme court in Turbeville relied upon earlier deci-
sions"0 which had allowed evidence of other crimes to be intro-
duced when offered to establish the following: (1) motive; (2) in-
tent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or
plan involving two or more crimes; or (5) the identity of the ac-
cused." The court noted that while this evidence is to be strictly
scrutinized in determining admissibility,32 it will not be found
inadmissible "merely because it incidentally proves the defen-
dant guilty of another crime."3' 3 The court concluded that the
testimony was admissible to show state of mind, an essential ele-
ment in the State's theory that Turbeville had either intention-
ally inflicted the wounds, or did so through criminal
negligence.
3 4
As a general rule, evidence of other criminal acts of the ac-
cused is inadmissible unless "relevant for some other purpose
than to show a probability that [the accused] committed the
crime because he is a man of criminal character." 35 The reluc-
tance of courts to admit such evidence is based upon the fear
that it will predispose the jury to believe that the accused is
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-11-20 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
There shall be no night hunting in this State except for racoons, opossums,
foxes, mink and skunk....
The use at night of artificial lights, except vehicle headlights while travel-
ing in a normal manner on a public road or highway, while in possession of or
with immediate access to both ammunition of a type prohibited for use at
night by this section and a weapon capable of firing such ammunition shall
constitute prima facie evidence of night deer hunting.
29. The jury deliberated for over eight hours. Brief for Appellant at 53.
30. See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. 635, 266 S.E.2d 426 (1980); State v. Conyers,
268 S.C. 276, 233 S.E.2d 95 (1977); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118 S.E. 803 (1923).
31. State v. Wilson, 274 S.C. at 637, 266 S.E.2d at 427. State v. Conyers, 268 S.C. at
280-81, 233 S.E.2d at 96. State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. at 416, 118 S.E.2d at 807.
32. 275 S.C. at 536, 273 S.E.2d at 764.
33. Id. (quoting State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807).
34. 275 S.C. at 536, 273 S.E.2d at 765.
35. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185 (2d ed. 1972) [herein-
after cited as McCoRMICK].
1982]
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guilty. This would strip the defendant of his presumption of in-
nocence." Further, evidence of other crimes compels the accused
to meet charges not raised in the indictment, confuses him in his
defense, and diverts the jury's attention.3
As the supreme court in Turbeville noted, there are excep-
tions to the traditional rule against admissibility of independent
crime evidence. However, the exceptions are subject to the gen-
eral proposition that the evidence must not unduly prejudice the
jury against the accused.38 Although the court stated that evi-
dence of the other crimes is to be subjected to strict scrutiny,39
the language of the case suggests that the focus of the examina-
tion is to be upon the connection between the two crimes,40 not
the potential prejudicial effect of the evidence on the jury.
If the prejudicial effect of the testimony concerning night
hunting in Turbeville had been given full consideration, the tes-
timony may have been held inadmissible. The circumstantial
connection between the two crimes seems tenuous at best.41 The
gun used by Turbeville was different from the one used in the
homicide, did not belong to the accused,42 and was fired only
once at a deer.43 Further, the prosecution had five witnesses to
the homicide.44 Thus, the testimony appears to have little proba-
36. See, e.g., State v. Conyers, 268 S.C. 276, 233 S.E.2d 95 (1977); State v. Gamble,
247 S.C. 214, 146 S.E.2d 709 (1966), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 927 (1968); State v. Sharpe,
239 S.C. 258, 122 S.E.2d 622 (1961); State v. Thompson, 230 S.C. 473, 96 S.E.2d 471
(1957); State v. Gregory, 191 S.C. 212, 4 S.E.2d 1 (1939); State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 118
S.E. 803 (1923).
37. State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. at 416, 118 S.E. at 807 (citing Commonwealth v. Jackson,
132 Mass. 15 (1882)).
38. McCoRMICK, supra note 35, at § 190.
39. 275 S.C. at 536, 273 S.E.2d at 764.
40. Id.
41. The connection between the offense charged and evidence of the offense sought
to be admitted was found significant in Quarles v. Commonwealth, 245 S.W.2d 947, 948-
49 (Ky. 1951):
[E]vidence of an independent offense is admissible even though it may have
some tendency to prove the commission of the crime charged, because the pro-
bative value of the evidence is greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect. This
is especially so where the evidence is of an isolated, wholly disconnected of-
fense. But the balance of scales is believed to be the other way where there is a
close relationship to the offense charged.
42. Record at 14, 89-90.
43. Id. at 15.
44. Id. at 4. Other cases have pointed to the availability of other evidence as another
factor to be considered in determining admissibility. See, e.g., Adkins v. Brett, 184 Cal.
252, 193 P. 251 (1920); State v. Gilligan, 92 Conn. 526, 103 A. 649 (1918); Tucker v.
6
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tive value. It seems far more likely that the accused, painted for
the jury as a law enforcement officer with frivolous disregard for
the law, lost his protection against unfair prejudice when the
testimony was admitted.45
The failure of the court in Turbeville to explicitly consider
the prejudicial effect of the independent crime testimony was ei-
ther an oversight or simply deemed unnecessary by the court.
The court extensively cited State v. Lyle, which clearly holds
that the relevancy of evidence of other crimes must be balanced
against the potential prejudicial effect."" The court in Lyle noted
that the inevitable tendency of such evidence is to "raise a le-
gally spurious presumption of guilt in the minds of the jurors. 41
Thus, the supreme court will probably continue to require a bal-
ancing approach to admission of evidence of other crimes.
Practitioners and lower courts should not read Turbeville to
hold that simply "pigeonholing" evidence of other crimes into
one of five exceptions will ensure admissibility. This evidence
must definitely fall within an exception. However, its ultimate
admissibility will continue to depend upon consideration of
other factors, such as prejudicial effect, which defy such a
mechanical approach.
Danny H. Mullis
III. HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF COCONSPIRATORS
In State v. Sullivan," the South Carolina Supreme Court
made several determinations concerning the admissibility of
hearsay statements made by coconspirators in the course of a
conspiracy. Following well-established precedents in the law of
evidence,49 the court reaffirmed as an exception to the hearsay
rule the principle that statements made by a coconspirator dur-
ing and in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible against
State, 82 Nev. 127, 412, P.2d 970 (1966).
45. This presumption of guilt is precisely what the court in State v. Lyle identified
as an inherent danger in admitting evidence of other crimes. 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at
807. See generally Reiser, Evidence of Other Criminal Acts in South Carolina, 28 S.C.L.
REV. 125 (1976).
46. 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807.
47. Id.
48. - S.C. ., 282 S.E.2d 838 (1981).
49. See infra note 55.
1982]
7
Mullis et al.: Evidence
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
all of the conspirators. The court held that order of proof is dis-
cretionary with the trial judge and declarations made by a con-
spirator to a third party may be admitted before prima facie
proof of conspiracy is shown. The court further held that the
indictment need not charge conspiracy for hearsay statements to
be admissible against the coconspirators.5 0 This decision reaf-
firms South Carolina's position in the mainstream of jurisdic-
tions that have decided these issues.5 1
The appellants in Sullivan were participants in a marijuana
smuggling operation. The trial court found six of the eight ap-
pellants52 guilty of possession of marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute and conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute. The remaining two appellants53 were convicted on one
count of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to dis-
tribute. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the convictions
against two of the appellants because there was insufficient evi-
dence to connect them with the conspiracy, and affirmed the
convictions of the other six.
5"
All of the appellants raised issues relating to the admissibil-
ity of hearsay statements made by coconspirators. Initially they
argued that there was insufficient evidence to show participation
in the conspiracy. A well-recognized exception to the hearsay
rule permits statements of one conspirator made during and in
furtherance of the conspiracy to be admissible against each
coconspirator. 5 For this exception to apply, however, the State
50. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 843.
51, See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 53,267 (2D ED. 1972
& Supp. 1978). See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E), United States v. Ciampaglia, 628
F.2d 632 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d
1040 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294 (2d Cir. 1977); United
States v. Spanos, 462 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sapperstein, 312 F.2d
694 (4th Cir. 1963); Glover v. United States, 306 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1962).
52. At the trial stage, there were fifteen defendants, but only the following eight
appealed: James Charles Dugan, Ralph Dennis Nichols, William Russell Jackson, George
Alexander Gedra, Kenneth Warran Davidson, James Thurmond Kincade, Steven Gerald
Schone, and Stan White,
53. William Russell Jackson and Stan White.
54. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 847.
55. State v. Ferguson, 221 S.C. 300, 70 S.E.2d 355 (1952); State v. Blackwell, 220
S.C. 342, 67 S.E.2d 684 (1951); accord, FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); United States v.
Spanos, 462 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1972); Laughlin v. United States, 385 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1003 (1968); United States v. Sapperstein, 312 F.2d 694 (4th
Cir. 1963); Glover v. United States, 306 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 34
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must present substantial and independent evidence of the exis-
tence of a conspiracy '6 and of the declarant's and the defen-
dant's participation therein. Hearsay evidence of coconspirators
is not sufficient in itself to establish an individual's participation
in the conspiracy.57 Further, there must be evidence as to each
alleged conspirator of deliberate, knowing intent to join the
conspiracy.5
The supreme court found that the State had met its burden
of proof on these issues as to all appellants except White and
It is important to note, however, that not all statements of coconspirators are admis-
sible against each conspirator. Evidence of acts and declarations of a conspirator prior to
the formation of the conspiracy or not in furtherance of the conspiracy is not admissible
under the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule.
Of course, evidence of other crimes may be admitted for other purposes, i.e., to
prove the specific crime charged when it tends to establish "(1) motive; (2) intent; (3) the
absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme or plan embracing the commission
of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to establish the
other; or (5) the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on
trial." State v. Blackwell, 220 S.C. 342, 355, 67 S.E.2d 684, 690 (1951) (quoting People v.
Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901)). See also State v. Richey, 88 S.C. 239, 70
S.E. 729 (1910); State v. Davis, 88 S.C. 204, 70 S.E. 417 (1910); State v. Kenny, 77 S.C.
236, 57 S.E. 859 (1907). Accord, FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
56. The evidence of the existence of a conspiracy must at least be sufficient to take
the question to the jury for these hearsay statements to be admitted against the cocon-
spirators. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see also United States v. James,
590 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
To prove the existence of a conspiracy, the State must show that the alleged mem-
bers knowingly agreed to participate toward a common goal or illegal end. Blumenthal v.
United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558 (1947). The nature of the agreement defines the scope
of the conspiracy. United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 742 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 405 U.S. 1040 (1972); United States v. Goss, 329 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
57. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); United States v. Bentvena, 319
F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1965), Glover v. United States, 306
F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1962); Stinson v. State, 151 Ga. App. 533, 260 S.E.2d 407 (1979).
58. United States v. Alvarez, 610 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101
S. Ct. 2017 (1981). Participation in a substantive criminal act or association with mem-
bers of a conspiracy will not make an individual a member of the conspiracy in the ab-
sence of such knowing intent. Miller v. United States, 382 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 984 (1968); Causey v. United States, 352 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1965);
Glover v. United States, 306 F.2d 594 (10th Cir. 1962).
Once prima facie evidence of conspiracy is shown and it is established beyond a
reasonable doubt that an individual was a part of the conspiracy, evidence of even slight
participation is sufficient to convict him of knowing participation in each act. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lopez, 625 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Jabara, 618 F.2d
1319 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1979); and United States v. Dunn, 564
F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1977).
9
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Gedra, whose convictions the court reversed.5" The appellants
further contended that the trial court erred in admitting the
hearsay declarations before the State established proof of the
conspiracy by independent evidence. The supreme court dis-
agreed, holding that order of proof is discretionary with the trial
judge 0 and that so long as prima facie evidence of conspiracy is
established before the close of evidence, the statements of al-
leged coconspirators may be admitted at any time. 1
The supreme court in Sullivan declined to adopt preferred
order of proof rule in South Carolina. 2 This rule requires that,
whenever possible, the existence of a conspiracy and the defen-
dant's connection with it be shown before allowing declarations
of coconspirators to be admitted. 63 The South Carolina Supreme
Court focused instead on the discretionary function of the trial
court and, finding no abuse of discretion, upheld the admissibil-
ity of the hearsay statements.8 4
The court also rejected appellants' argument that they were
prejudiced by introduction of hearsay evidence on the conspir-
acy indictment because such evidence would not have been ad-
missible on the possession charge if this charge had been tried
separately. The court held that the indictment need not charge
conspiracy for the declarations of one coconspirator to be admis-
sible against another alleged coconspirator. 5 The well-settled
rule in South Carolina is that declarations of a coconspirator are
admissible, even though the indictment failed to charge conspir-
acy, so long as there is a prima facie showing of the existence of
59. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 843.
60. United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320 (4th Cir. 1973); State v. Rutledge, 261
S.C. 44, 198 S.E.2d 250 (1973).
61. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 843.
62. - S.C. at, 282 S.E.2d at 842-43 (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942)).
63. See, e.g., United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581-582 (5th Cir. 1979). Jurisdic-
tions advocating the preferred order of proof rule have not rigidly applied it, however,
and allow courts discretion in admitting hearsay statements prior to proof of conspiracy,
provided the hearsay statements are linked to the proof of conspiracy before the end of
trial. See, e.g., United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
101 S. Ct. 3008 (1981); United States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 101 S. Ct. 2316 (1981); United States v. Continental Group, Inc. 603 F.2d 444 (3d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1979); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
64. - S.C. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 843.
65. Id. at -, 282 S.E.2d at 843.
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a conspiracy.66 This rule applies even though the declarations
were not made in the presence of the accused. 7
The rule permitting statements of coconspirators to be ad-
mitted as evidence against each member of the conspiracy is well
established in South Carolina, and in State v. Sullivan, the
court refused to require a preferred order of proof as a refine-
ment of the rule. Practitioners representing members of a con-
spiracy would thus be well advised to allow flexibility in their
trial strategy considering this interpretation of the rule.
Suzanne Hulst Clawson
IV. ArORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
State v. Adams68 is the latest in a short line of South Caro-
lina cases discussing the attorney-client privilege.6 9 In Adams,
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the in-court disclo-
sure by the defendant's former attorney of his professional im-
pressions of the voluntariness of the defendant's confession vio-
lated the attorney-client priviledge.7 ° In so holding, the court
joins the majority of jurisdictions in extending the definition of a
confidential communication to include those forms of communi-
cation which are neither oral nor written. 1
Following the defendant's arrest on charges of housebreak-
ing, kidnapping, and murder, the court appointed Thomas Mc-
Kinney to represent him. After the appointment of McKinney,
Adams confessed in detail to the charges against him. Before
trial, however, Adams became dissatisfied with McKinney and
66. State v. Blackwell, 220 S.C. 342, 67 S.E.2d 684 (1951); State v. Rice, 49 S.C. 418,
27 S.E. 452 (1897); State v. Green, 40 S.C. 328, 18 S.E. 933 (1894).
67. State v. Blackwell, 220 S.C. 342, 354-55, 67 S.E.2d 684, 690 (quoting State v.
Simon, 132 W. Va. 322, 342, 52 S.E.2d 725, 735 (1949)).
68. - S.C. -, 283 S.E.2d 582 (1981).
69. See State v. Doster, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d at 218 (1981); State v. Love, 275
S.C. 55, 271 S.E.2d 110 (1980); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 260 S.C.
245, 195 S.E.2d 615 (1973). For earlier South Carolina cases briefly discussing the policy
behind the attorney-client privilege, see generally Drayton v. Industrial Health and Life
Ins. Co., 205 S.C. 98, 31 S.E.2d 148 (1944); State v. Rook, 174 S.C. 225, 177 S.E. 143
(1934); Clary v. Blackwell, 160 S.C. 142, 158 S.E.2d 223 (1931); Sandel v. State, 126 S.C.
1, 119 S.E. 776 (1923).
70. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 586.
71. See C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 89 (2d ed. 1972 &
Supp. 1978); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2306 n.2 (McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp. 1981).
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asserted that his confession had been coerced. McKinney's peti-
tion for relief from the case was thereafter granted.72
During trial and before Adams took the stand, McKinney
testified for the State that, based on his perception of Adams
during an interview prior to the signing of the confession, it was
his opinion that Adams' confession was freely and voluntarily
given.7 3 He also testified that he had gone over the written con-
fession "line by line" to assure its accuracy.74 Adams was subse-
quently convicted on all counts.
Appealing his conviction, Adams asserted that McKinney's
disclosure on the stand of his opinion of the voluntariness of Ad-
ams' confession violated the attorney-client privilege because the
opinion was apparently based on observations made during a
confidential communication.75 The supreme court agreed, and
held that Adams' attorney-client privilege had been violated. 6
The court restated the policy upon which the privilege is
based-the promotion of the relationship between attorney and
client by the assurance of utmost confidence and secrecy. The
majority then premised its decision on a finding that the spirit
of the policy demands that the entire setting of the communica-
tion be protected.7 The court also observed that a policy limit-
ing the scope of the privilege to words spoken but allowing dis-
closure of impressions conveyed by those words would destroy
the substance of the privilege.7 8
72. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 585.
73. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 585-86.
74. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 585.
75. Id. at, 283 S.E.2d at 586. Adams also appealed several other alleged errors in
his bifurcated capital trial: (1) the trial court's refusal to permit defense counsel to ex-
amine notes to which one of the State's police witnesses referred during his testimony,
Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 583-85; (2) the prosecutor's questions to the defendant on cross-
examination during the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, which put at issue defen-
dant's feelings about sentencing, Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 584-85; and (3) failure of the
trial court to correct an error during the guilt or innocence phase in its statement of the
law to the jury, Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 586-88.
76. Id. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 586.
77. Id. The court relied on its most recent pronouncement on the privilege in State
v. Doster, - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 218 (1981). An informant in Doster sought the advice
of outside counsel before trial to determine the propriety of his attorney's representation
of multiple defendants. When the outside counsel was called on by the defense to testify
concerning his conversations with the informant, he successfully asserted the privilege on
his client's behalf.
78. - S.C. at -, 283 S.E.2d at 586.
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The State argued that the defendant waived the privilege
by repudiating the voluntariness of his confession and disputing
before trial the propriety of McKinney's representation of him.
The State cited MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 4-104(c)(4), which allows lawyers to reveal confidences in de-
fending themselves against charges of wrongful conduct. The
court dismissed this defense on the ground that Adams had not
charged McKinney with any wrongful conduct at trial when the
State introduced McKinney's testimony, and therefore, McKin-
ney could not have not been acting in self-defense when he dis-
closed his privileged information.
7 9
The rule adopted in Adams is in accord with the majority
rule regarding nonverbal communications." In those jurisdic-
tions where the issue has been addressed, the courts have uni-
formly supported the privileged nature of communications to an
attorney which are neither oral nor written.81 The rationale be-
hind the rule is that the privilege should protect any informa-
tion gained by an attorney in the ordinary course of his employ-
ment as a client's counselor.8 2 Although the South Carolina
Supreme Court has only recently begun to explore the rationale
behind the attorney-client privilege,8" the court thus far shows
no sign of breaking with the majority on any issue of substance.
The court's concern with the protection of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege is laudable. However, it is hoped that future pro-
79. Id. at _, 283 S.E.2d at 586.
80. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2306 n.2 (McNaughton rev. 1961 & Supp. 1981).
81. An example of a privileged nonverbal, nonwritten communication from another
jurisdiction is found in State v. Dawson, 90 Mo. 149, 1 S.W. 827 (1886). In Dawson, an
attorney defending clients charged with the theft of $160 in silver coins was not allowed
to testify that he was paid in silver coins. The court decided that "[t]he reason of the
rule protects a client from a disclosure [of] any information which [the attorney] has
derived from his client ... [T]o restrict the privilege to oral or written communications
would make the rule infinitely narrower than the reason upon which it is based." 90 Mo.
at 155, 1 S.W. at 829.
82. See Ex Parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 139 P. 566 (1915). The privilege itself
does not exist unless the attorney is consulted in his professional capacity as an attorney
or counselor. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.
Mass 1950)(business advice held not privileged); Olender v. United States, 210 F.2d 795
(9th Cir. 1954) (attorney engaged as accountant held not within privilege).
83. The confidentiality privilege was first expounded upon at length in South Caro-
lina State Highway Dep't v. Booker, 260 S.C. 245, 195 S.E.2d 615 (1973) and was stated
again in State v. Love, 275 S.C. 55, 271 S.E.2d 110 (1980). Before Booker, no South
Carolina Supreme Court case had gone into any detail in discussing the theoretical un-
derpinnings of the privilege.
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nouncements by the court will identify those situations in which
an attorney is allowed to testify as to confidential
communications.
John R. Devlin, Jr.
V. INTERSPOUSAL WIRETAPS
In Baumrind v. Ewing,84 the South Carolina Supreme Court
made its first determination of the applicability of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 196885 to wiretaps per-
formed in the course of interspousal espionage. The court held
that when a husband who lives in the marital home uses a wire-
tap to record telephone conversations between his wife and a
man suspected to be her lover, the recordings cannot be sup-
pressed as evidence under section 2515 of the Act.8" This deci-
sion places South Carolina in the minority of jurisdictions that
have decided this issue.8
Suspecting infidelity as the basis for his wife's decision to
leave him, plaintiff Baumrind, on his own initiative and without
assistance, installed an extension phone and recording device in
the closet of the spare bedroom of the home he shared with his
wife.88 Unknown to his wife, he proceeded to eavesdrop on her
conversations.8 ' Armed with recordings of conversation between
his wife and the defendant Ewing, Baumrind instituted an ac-
tion for alienation of affection and criminal conversation against
the defendant.90 The defendant moved before trial to suppress
the recordings on the ground that they violated the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.9" The trial judge
found that the Act did not apply and denied the motion.92 The
defendant appealed the denial of this motion; the South Caro-
84. 276 S.C. 350, 279 S.E.2d 359 (1981).
85. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, -2520 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
86. 276 S.C. at 353, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
87. E.g. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson v. Simp-
son, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974); Beaber v. Beaber, 41
Ohio Misc. 95, 322 N.E.2d 910 (1974).
88. Record at 32-34.
89. Id. at 34.
90. Id. at 3-7.
91. Id. at 9.
92. Id. at 19.
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lina Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case for trial.9 3
Although the supreme court acknowledged that the "naked lan-
guage" of the Act calls for a broad prohibition of wiretapping,'4
it held the Act inapplicable to the facts of Baumrind.95 The
court reasoned that the Act was primarily aimed at criminal vio-
lations and that although Congress may have intended that the
Act apply to interspousal wiretaps performed by a third party
such as a private detective, 98 it would be overreaching the pur-
poses of the Act to prohibit one spouse from intercepting the
wire communications of another in their mutually shared
home.97 In explanation of its position, the court noted that Con-
gress typically leaves such matters as marital conflicts to the dis-
cretion of the states9" and that, in any event, spouses have little
or no justifiable expectation of privacy in their home."' Because
the court was unable to discern a positive legislative intent that
the Act extend to cases like Baumrind, it was constrained to
find an implied exception in the Act for interspousal wiretap-
ping in the marital home.100 The court, however, specifically lim-
ited its holding to the facts of this case, leaving open the ques-
tion whether the statute would apply to a married couple living
apart.
101
The court's decision in Baumrind is questionable in several
respects. At the outset, Baumrind appears to go against the
clear weight of the authority. In reaching its decision, the court
summarily rejected an entire line of cases which have held that
the Act prohibits intramarital wiretapping, 10 2 and instead relied
93. 276 S.C. at 353, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
94. Id. at 351, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
95. Id. at 353, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
96. Id. at 352, 279 S.E.2d at 360. For similar reasoning, see, e.g., United States v.
Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 1978); White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d 1067, 1071 (8th Cir.
1976); Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d 803, 809 (5th Cir. 1974) cert. denied.
97. 276 S.C. at 353, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d 907 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 908
(1978); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); White v. Weiss, 535 F.2d
1067 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1974); Gill v.
Willer, 482 F. Supp. 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1980); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa.
1979); Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. Pa. 1975); State v. Jock, 404
A.2d 518 (Del. Super. Ct. 1979); Stamme v. Stamme, 589 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. App. 1979);
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heavily on Simpson v. Simpson,0 3 a factually similar case10 de-
cided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit.
Moreover, the court's concern that applying the Act to the
facts of Baumrind would overreach its purpose appears to be
unfounded. The Act, which is organized in three tiers, is all en-
compassing in scope. The first tier of the Act is aimed at crimi-
nal offenses and provides criminal sanctions; 105 its second tier is
aimed at both civil and criminal offenses and provides for exclu-
sion of evidence illegally obtained;10 6 and its third tier is aimed
at civil offenses and provides civil damages.10 7 Thus, domestic
disputes would appear to be well within the ambit of the Act.
The court also appears to have erred in refusing to follow the
plain language of the statute and by relying instead upon "in-
conclusive" legislative history 08 to create an implied exception
to the statute's coverage.109 A well-established principle of statu-
tory interpretation is that when a statute is clear and unambigu-
ous on its face, a court will not refer to legislative history in con-
struing it.110  It is difficult to imagine a statute more
comprehensive and unambiguous than the Omnibus Crime and
Control Act. The Act clearly states that "except as otherwise
specifically provided . . . any person who . . . willfully in-
tercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other person to
intercept, or endeavors to intercept any wire or oral communica-
Connin v. Connin, 89 Misc. 2d 548, 392 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1976).
103. 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 897 (1974).
104. Mrs. Simpson and her husband were living together at the time of the wiretap-
ping. Mr. Simpson performed the tap without outside assistance. 490 F.2d at 804. Com-
pare, United States v. Rizzo, 583 F.2d at 907 (spouse hired a private detective to inter-
cept telephone conversations between her husband and third parties); United States v.
Jones, 542 F.2d at 663 (husband and wife were living apart at the time he intercepted
her calls); United States v. Schrimsher, 493 F.2d at 849 (defendant and prosecutrix were
former lovers who were not married at the time the defendant intercepted and taped her
calls); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 465-66 (husband and wife were separated, but
living in the same house at the time the husband hired a private detective to intercept
his wife's phone calls); Remington v. Remington, 393 F. Supp. at 898-99 (wife hired a
private detective to intercept her husband's calls).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Supp. 1980).
108. See 276 S.C. at 351, 279 S.E.2d at 359; Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 806.
109. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 666; Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at
468.
110. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 667; Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 468.
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tion. . .," is subject to the Act's provisions. Thus, the Act
plainly provides that exceptions to the rule will be specifically
enumerated, and absent such specific exceptions, the statute
covers any person who violates its provisions.112 Interspousal
wiretaps are in no way specifically excepted from the statute's
coverage.113 Since Congress apparently was aware of the use of
wiretaps in domestic disputes,114 it can only be concluded that
Congress intended the Act to cover domestic wiretapping.1 5
Another of the Act's provisions states that any wire or oral
communication intercepted by any person not specifically au-
thorized to do so shall not be received in evidence in any judicial
proceeding.11 Significantly, the statutory definition of person in-
cludes "any individual. 11 The Act's unambiguous language
should be interpreted to mean that any individual not otherwise
authorized by the plain language of the statute is prohibited
from intercepting any oral or wire communications between
third parties.118 This construction would reach Mr. Baumrind's
actions. Thus, because Baumrind performed a tap that violated
the letter of the Act, the information that he acquired should
have been deemed illegal and inadmissible as evidence. 19
As a final matter, several of the court's observations in
Baumrind about the privacy interests protected by the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act appear to be unsound. The
distinction the court draws between interspousal wiretaps per-
formed by a third party and those undertaken without third-
111. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
112. Id.
113. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510, -2520 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
114. See, United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 668, n.12. Professor G. Robert Blakey,
one of the primary draftors of Title III, stated that "the use of electronic surveillance
techniques in this country has ... widely fallen into the hands of private individuals
and [has] been used chiefly in two areas: Domestic relations investigations and commer-
cial espionage." Hearings on the Right to Privacy Act of 1967 Before the Subcommittee
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 413 (1967). See also S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 225
(1967); reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2274.
115. See Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 470-71; Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 290
N.C. 373, 381, 226 S.E.2d 347, 352 (1976).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(6)(1976).
118. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 667, 671; Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp.
at 469-70.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1976).
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party participation is largely illusory. This view, which presumes
that a third party intrusion into the marital home is a much
greater violation of privacy than personal surveillance by the
other spouse,120 ignores the very purpose of the Act: to protect
privacy by prohibiting all interceptions except those otherwise
provided for.
121
The court's suggestion that one spouse has little or no justi-
fiable right to an expectation of privacy in the marital home vis-
a-vis the other spouse is also troublesome.122 Notably, the court
distinguished from Baumrind a case1 23 in which the spouses
were living apart at the time of the interception, indicating that
under those circumstances the interception should be prohibited
because the expectations of privacy are greater and more justifi-
able. 124 Although at first glance this reasoning seems logical,'
12 it
120. See Simpson v. Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809; Baumrind v. Ewing, 276 S.C. at 352-
53, 279 S.E.2d at 360.
121. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970 & Supp. 1980). It makes no difference whether a spouse
hires someone else to do the surveillance or does it himself, the end result is the same.
The private detective acts only as the agent of the spouse and it is the spouse who will
use the product of the tap. Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 471-72.
122. Even if the court's assumption is correct, it is irrelevant for the purposes of
Title III since interception of wire communications is proscribed regardless of any expec-
tation of privacy. Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. at 472-73. The Act distinguishes between
"oral" and "wire" interceptions; only the definition of "oral" interception requires an
expectation of privacy in order to be prohibited. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2)(1976). The defini-
tion of "wire" interception has no such requirement. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1)(1976).
123. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976).
124. 276 S.C. at 352-53, 279 S.E.2d at 360. This distinction drawn between the two
cases is somewhat illusory because Baumrind had moved to the spare bedroom before
the interception took place. He and his wife were thus separated, although they were still
living in the same house. Record at 32; See Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 (husband
and wife estranged but living in the same house at the time of the interception).
125. Because the marital relationship has been traditionally viewed as one of inti-
macy and sharing, courts have been reluctant to examine the issue of interspousal pri-
vacy. It is, however, highly questionable whether marital vows should protect surrepti-
tious interceptions by one spouse of the other's private telephone conversations with
third parties. After all, Congress intended Title III to be applicable to all individuals who
violate its provisions.
Courts have slowly come to recognize the need for legal and personal individuality
within a marriage. Increasingly, the notion that husband and wife are one entity is being
abandoned. See, e.g., United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960); Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972). See also, The Equal Opportunity Credit Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1976);
Comment, Interspousal Electronic Surveillance Immunity, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 185, 190
n.27 (1975).
This consideration of individual privacy rights in interspousal wiretapping cases
would certainly bring the courts closer to a decision that perpetuates the Congressional
18
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circumvents an important consideration: when one spouse taps
the other's calls, it is not only the privacy of the targeted spouse
which is violated, but also the privacy of every person who calls
the marital home.""6 Thus, Baumrind ignores the well-estab-
lished principle that the right to privacy is designed to protect
people not places.'
2 7
The cases other than Baumrind that have considered inter-
spousal expectations of privacy have concerned only the rights
of spouse vis-a-vis spouse, not spouse vis-a-vis a third party. 28
Even if marital privilege somehow transcends certain fundamen-
tal rights of a spouse in relation to his mate, surely this privilege
cannot extend to abrogate the rights of third parties. Clearly,
the court could not have thoroughly examined the ramifications
of its decision to have left so vital a point in question.
As a result of Baumrind, evidence procured through inter-
spousal wiretaps performed by one spouse in the marital home is
admissible in South Carolina courts, even against third parties.
The holding of Baumrind is, however, limited to the fact situa-
tion of that case. The supreme court has not yet ruled on the
permissibility of third party wiretaps or wiretaps between mar-
riage partners living separately. Consequently, it would be advis-
intent that all individuals should be protected from unauthorized wire surveillance.
126. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d at 670. The inherent offensiveness of this situ-
ation was described by Mr. Justice Brandeis:
Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of
the line is invaded and all conversations between them upon any subject, and
although proper, confidential and privileged, may be overhead. Moreover, the
tapping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of
every other person whom he may call or who may call him. As a means of
espionage, writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments
of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire-tapping.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 475-76 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Brandeis' opinion that there is a constitutional right to privacy in wire communications
was later accepted by a majority of the Court in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967),
and in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
127. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
128. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977); Simpson v.
Simpson, 490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974). Notably, in Gill v. Wilier, 482 F. Supp. 776
(W.D.N.Y. 1980), a suit for damages by the third party conversant, the court distin-
guished Anonymous on the grounds that in Anonymous no nonfamily member was in-
volved. The court in Gill saw this as a controlling factor and denied defendant's motion
to dismiss.
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able for practitioners to proceed carefully in advising their cli-
ents about interspousal wiretapping.
129
Suzanne Hulst Clawson
129. After the Baumrind decision the United States Attorney General for the Dis-
trict of South Carolina noted opposition to the court's holding in a letter to the Tran-
script. He asserted that "all wiretapping, interspousal included, still constitutes a crimi-
nal act as far as [his] office is concerned." He further stated that every incident of
wiretapping reported to his office will be investigated, and where it is in the best interest
of the public to do so, wiretapping will be prosecuted. For this reason, he suggested that
lawyers advise their clients against wiretapping. Letter from Henry Dargan McMaster,
United States Attorney to 0. Daniels Black, Editor of the Transcript (January 20, 1982).
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